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I. Introduction
In biology, the concept of herd immunity refers to the process of protecting a
whole group from a disease by immunizing a critical mass of its populace.I Once
that critical mass is immune, the likelihood of outbreak is reduce significantly,
leading to the longevity of the group.2 The herd immunity model goes beyond
animals, however, and can be applied to the future of personal data security
around the world. On May 25, 2018, the European Union will enforce its new
data protection laws, the General Data Protection Regulation.(GDPR). 3 All for-
eign companies and organizations that operate within the European Union or
with data processing outside of the EU will need to comply with the GDPR if
they wish to carry on their business and store and process European data.4 With
their requirements of compliance, the EU is exporting their data privacy values
abroad and setting a standard for the international community to establish for
their own citizens, offering the world a privacy vaccination. While a step towards
future rights for the international community, it is more likely that organizations
will create two-tiers of data protection systems in order to comply with the new
regulations and continue to maintain many of their data processing and selling
* JD Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I Emily Willingham & Laura Helft, What is Herd Immunity? NOVA, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
nova/body/herd-immunity.html.
2 Id.
3 Matt Burgess, What is GDPR? The Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance in the UK, WIRED (Apr.
19, 2018), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-compliance-summary-fines-
2018.
4 Burgess, supra note 3.
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practices. These data values will have a minimal effect on influencing data pro-
tection policy for U.S. citizens. Through continued massive surveillance and the
intent of passing the FISA Amendments Act of 2017 (H.R. 4478) in an effort to
renew and expand the Executive branch's power over data collection and surveil-
lance under Section 702, the Executive branch seeks to circumvent the GDPR
rights and private sector compliance. While the GDPR will likely mitigate some
of the average consumer threats from external forces and sale of information
from private businesses, the expansion of H.R. 4478 and the temporary ban on
"about target" searches will override the protections that the EU has afford to its
citizens, negating the vaccination attempts by the EU. In other words, the critical
mass will not be reached.
The background is split into two parts. The first section will focus on the
history of data protection in Europe, the problems that led to the replacement of
the previous legislation called the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD),
and the contents of the GDPR. This will include the goals of the new legislation
and the rights that have been carved out for EU citizens.
The second section will analyze the cyber-threats that currently faced by the
American public and the international community and the ineffectual options for
retaliation or prevention of cyber-attacks. This will establish why providing citi-
zens with the opportunity to protect their own information through various rights
is a security bonus.
Delving into the history of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), this
article will assess the scope of current U.S. cyber security programs and regula-
tory agencies under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments
of 2008, and the new amendments to FISA under H.R. 4478 upon these agencies.
The analysis will focus on the theory of herd immunity and how U.S. busi-
nesses and organizations will integrate the compliance requirements of the GDPR
when processing European data, while still providing massive amounts of data to
national security agencies allowed under the exceptions to these rights for sur-
veillance and under the expansion of FISA Amendments Act of 2008 through the
H.R. 4478. As total compliance is an the unreasonable expectation and the crea-
tion of a two-tiered system of data protection will ultimately leave international
and European data at greater risk from the cyber-security threats and government
overreaching. In Part 2, the discussion will turn to preventing either group from
being protected preventing either group from being protected and simultaneously
allowing a potential FISA renewal to circumvent the rights completely.
Finally, the proposal will discuss the need for a restriction on FISA and a
change in the American view of the commodity of data in order to ensure the
effectiveness of the GDPR. Without this change, the GDPR, while effective in
the short-term, will not be an international change, despite being the premiere
protection of consumer data rights.
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II. Background
A. European Data Protection History and the GDPR
Citizens of EU member states are protected under a stronger and more holistic
framework than the United States has because the EU has a recognized right to
data privacy.5 Europe's strong history of data protection extends back to the early
days of the UN. 6 In the aftermath of World War H and at the beginning of the
Cold War, the UN recognized how the collection and storage of civilians' per-
sonal information allowed governments, like the Nazis, to target individuals and
groups during purges.7 This gruesome realization influenced the European Con-
vention on Human Rights to include protections of data, basing European's rights
on dignity and honor.8 While some European nations established their own data
protection acts in the late 1970s, the UN began drafting guidelines to govern data
for other states to adopt.9 The process was slow and arduous, but ultimately final-
ized a decade later.i0
Fifteen years later, in October 1995, the DPD was passed and became the
guiding principles for adjudicators in the EU data protection realm for the next
twenty years.II The DPD were based on the Fair Information Principles, provid-
ing rights to information, access to the data, and the ability to rectify the data, if
necessary.1 2 These rights were a minimum standard for national law and the vari-
ous member states could add more additional protection laws, depending on what
they believed was necessary.1 3 Paired with these rights, the DPD employed an
adequacy requirement, requesting that Member States deal exclusively with third
parties, further requiring countries to provide adequate protection for data.14
5 Paul J. Watanabe, An Ocean Apart: The Transatlantic Data Privacy Divide and the Right to Era-
sure, 90 S. CAL. L. REv. 1111, 1114 (2018) [hereinafter Watanabe].
6 Steven S. Mccarty-Snead & Anne Titus Htlby, Research Guide to European Data Protection Law,
42 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 348, 360 (2014).
7 Id.; see also Charles Hawley, Fifty Million Nazi Documents: Germany Agrees to Open Holocaust
Archive, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 19, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/fifty-million-nazi-docu
ments-germany-agrees-to-open-holocaust-archive-a-411983.html (30-50 million documents detailing the
exterminations within the camps in clear detail, the sheer volume of information reinforces the dangers
that can occur when personal data is abusively collected).
8 William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIz. L. REv. 959, 967 (2016) [herein-
after McGeveran].
9 Paul de Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data
Privacy: Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency? 9 I/S: J. L.
Po'Y INFO. Soc'y 271, 281-82 (2013) (France and Germany had already implemented data protection
policies, with the French Law on Informatics, Data Banks and Freedoms (1978) and the first Federal
Data Protection Act (1977)).
10 Id. at 282.
Watanabe, supra note 5, at 1119.
12 de Hert & Papakonstantinou, supra note 9, at 10.
13 McGeveran, supra note 8, at 969.
14 The EU-US Privacy Shield Framework is based on this adequacy principle. See also de Hert &
Papakonstantinou, supra note 9, at 279.
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By 2012, the DPD was ineffective and unable to cope with modern technologi-
cal strategies that threaten personal information online.' 5 While the DPD was
founded on many of the same principles as the GDPR legislation, its minimum
requirements led to a lack of standardization throughout EU member states, hin-
dering the data transfer channels between nations.1 6 The obligations of compa-
nies under the legislation created administrative burdens and excessive costs.1 7
The inherent distrust in the data protection abilities between member states
threatened potential economic stagnation, as the benefits of trading and operating
within a member state with weaker data protection laws exposed the information
to a variety of cyber-threats and thefts. The U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA) further exacerbated the fears of intrusions into EU data privacy when
Snowden leaked information revealing the NSA systematic and chronic data col-
lection and storage practices, without the employment of proper oversight and
respect for the privacy rights under the DPD.' 8 After four years drafting and
revisions, the GDPR was approved in 2016, with an enforcement date of May 25,
2018.
Replacing the DPD and drawing upon Article 8(1) of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, the GDPR posits that every European citi-
zen has a right to protection of personal data. The intention behind this right is to
encourage freedom, increase security, and support justice.1 9 In addition to the
protections, the GDPR seeks to strengthen the economics of the EU and harmo-
nize the cyber-laws to encourage trust and growth. 20
Article 5 of the GDPR sets forth the principles and limitations for organiza-
tions that fall under its jurisdiction. 2 1 The data must be lawfully and fairly
processed, in a transparent manner and for an explicitly, specified purpose. To
accomplish this, the GDPR will include restrictions on the length of time that
15 GDPR Timeline of Events, EUGDPR.oRa, https://www.eugdpr.org/gdpr-timeline.html; de Hert &
Papakonstantinou, supra note 9, at 311 (frameworks for new data protection acts were reviewed starting
in 2009, but the first drafts of the what would become the GDPR were presented in 2012).
16 General Data Protection Regulation, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Apr. 6, 2016) at art. 9,
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-INIT/en/pdf [hereinafter GDPR]; see also
Scott J. Shackleford & Scott Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Transatlantic
Study, 67 S.C. L. Riv. 609 (Spring 2016) (the continuous struggle of centralization, in which EU mem-
ber states seek to maintain their sovereignty and individual national goals, while simultaneously seeking
to create more accountability and smoother operations complicates the future of cybersecurity policy
despite the newest legislation).
17 Francoise Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New Compliance Requirements in Sight-What
Proposed EU Data Regulation Means For U.S. Companies, 28 SANlA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 817-
18 (2012).
Is Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/worldlinteractive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-deco
ded.
19 GDPR, supra note 16, at preamble; Rohan Massey, Heather Sussman, et al., Countdown to Com-
pliance: One Year to go until GDPR Enforcement, RoPms & GRAY 1, 2 (May 26, 2017) [hereinafter
Countdown to GDPR Compliance].
20 GDPR, supra note 16; Countdown to GDPR Compliance, supra note 19.
21 GDPR, supra note 16, at art. 5.
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data may be held and for long that data may be used to identify the citizen. 2 2 This
Fair Processing Principle will carry over from the DPD, relating to collection,
disclosure, retention, and disposal of personal data.2 3
The GDPR will continue to guard European citizens' rights regarding the abil-
ity to access their own personal data. It will also impart a right to erasure; a
right to rectification; new rules regarding consent; data portability rights; a right
to be informed; a right to object; and rights related to automated decision making
including profiling. 24
The right for a citizen to be informed is guaranteed under Articles 13-15 of the
GDPR. 2 5 When collecting and processing data, a data controller must inform
citizens as to the purpose of the collection of data the recipient of the data, and
the time frame for the collection of the data.26 If a data controller has received
personal data from another source, the controller must state where the informa-
tion originated, the legal basis for that information, other recipients of that infor-
mation, and the categorization of data received. 27 Article 15, known as the right
of access, allows the citizen to request and obtain a confirmation from the data
controller as to whether the personal data is being used and the reason for its use.
Further, as an additional safeguard, when information is transported outside of
this country, the data controller must list the protective measures utilized by the
recipient country to protect personal data. 28
Under the right to erasure, commonly dubbed "the right to be forgotten" in the
U.S., individuals may request the removal of processed personal data if: (1). the
data is no longer a necessity; (2) has no relation to the original purpose; (3) the
individual has withdrawn consent; (4) the data was unlawfully processed under
the GDPR; (5) the data must be deleted for compliance; or the data references a
minor.29 The right to erasure also existed under the DPD and was most notably
applied in a case from the Court of Justice of the European (CJEU), in which
Google Spain was ordered to honor requests to remove unnecessary data. 30 The
court cited the economic incentives to remove out-of-date information as a boon
to Google. Following the establishment of a request mechanism to have data
22 Id.
23 Processing Personal Data Fairly and Lawfully (Principle 1): What Does Fair Processing Mean?
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER's OFFIcE (last visited on Dec. 4, 2017) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/
guide-to-data-protection/principle- I-fair-and-lawfull.
24 GDPR, supra note 16; Countdown to GDPR Compliance, supra note 19, at 2; Watanabe, supra
note 5, at 1120-21.
25 GDPR, supra note 16, at arts. 13-15; §51.04 The General Data Protection Act, 6-51 COMPUTER L.
1, 5-7(2016) [hereinafter §51.04 GDPR].
26 Id. at 5-6 (Article 13).
27 Id. at 6 (Article 14).
28 Id. at 6-7.
29 GDPR, supra note 16, at art. 17; Right to Erasure, INFORMATION COMMISSIONER'S Oi4'ice-, https://
ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-
to-erasure/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).
30 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espariola de Proteccidn de Datos, 2014 E.C.J. C-131/12, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ENTXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJOI 31&from=EN.
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removed, Google reported receiving hundreds of thousands of requests for data to
be removed from every EU member state. 3 1
In conjunction with the right of erasure, Article 7 requires conditional consent
dependent on the processing of particular data.32 Data controllers must ensure
that the consent that they have received is specific to the purpose under which
they are processing the data. Citizens are allowed to freely give and revoke con-
sent in relation to the processing of their data.3 3 Article 9 of the GDPR provides a
list of personal data types, ranging from racial origins to political affiliations to
sexual orientation, which may never be processed except for circumstances with
explicit consent or the use in defense of legal claims. 3 4
Known as the right of portability, Article 20 of the GDPR allows citizens the
right to receive the data from the data controller in a form that the citizen may
employ for personal use.3 5 The data controllers must provide two types of data to
the citizen upon request: (1) data actively and knowingly provided and (2) data
observed via use of the service of a device. 36 Data controllers are required to
maintain the minimum amount of information for the limited duration that a citi-
zen uses the service provided. Third parties are only allowed to see the maximum
amount of information they need to accomplish their action, rather than having
access to an entire individual's metadata on the app.3 7
Article 3 of the GDPR expands the territorial scope of the individuals and
organizations that must comply with the legislation under the new law.3 8 To
overcome the previous ambiguity of whether the Directive applied, the GDPR is
explicit and states that all data controllers and data processors that work with EU
data will be responsible for complying, regardless of their place of business. Fur-
thermore, all non-EU business will have to select an EU representative if they
process the data of EU citizens. 39 This includes organizations that provide free
goods and services to customers in the European markets.40 EU states are respon-
sible for ensure that their laws comply with the GDPR.
31 W. Gregory Voss & Celine Castets-Renard, International and Comparative Technology Law: Pro-
posal for an International Taxonomy on the Various Forms of the "Right to be Forgotten": A study on
the Convergence of Norms, 14 Coi.o. TECH. L.J. 281, 287 (2016) (519,733 search engine results, as of
April 2, 2016, indicate the right is widely exercised in the EU).
32 § 51.04 GDPR, supra note 25, at 4.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 32-33.
36 Id. at 33 (The GDPR does not require data that has been inferred based off the other forms be
provided to the data subject).
37 Id.
38 Linda V. Priebe, How EU Data Privacy Reform Will Impact US Telecom Cos., LAw360 (Mar. 21,
2017), https://www.1aw360.com/articies/903685/how-eu-data-privacy-reform-will-impact-us-telecom-
cos-.
39 GDPR Key Changes, https://www.eugdpr.org/.
40 AJ Dellinger, EU's GDPR: What Will American Companies Have to Do to Comply, INT'L Bus.
Tiuis (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.com/eus-gdpr-what-will-american-companies-have-do-com
ply-2573002.
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Data controllers and data processors will also have heightened responsibilities
related to security, requiring that the implementation of security measures be
proportionate and appropriate for the risks that are present, rather than simply
having an arbitrary level of security. 4 1 The previous requirements on alerting the
affected parties of security breaches without undue delay for telecommunication
companies under the Directive will be expanded under the GDPR to include all
companies.4 2 In the event of a breach that impacts personal data, entities will be
required to report that breach within 72 hours.4 3
To regulate compliance, the GDPR establishes a European Data Protection
Board (EDPB) to guide the formation of compliance. EDPB will approve code
practices and certification schemes for various entities. As an appellate body, the
EDPB reviews disputes that will inevitably arise. 4 Failure to comply with the
new regulations or infringing on a person's rights will result in a fine of either
4% or 20 million pounds, whichever amount is larger.45
These rights are not absolute rights under Article 23 and Chapter IX of the
GDPR and will be subjected to a variety of limitations, such as for the national
defense, persecution of a crime. 46 Under a necessary and proportionate standard
of review, member states are allowed to introduce exemptions and derogations
that would further allow the processing of data beyond the limits set for in Article
5.47
B. Cyber Threats and the New Battlefield
In 2014, the United States charged five Chinese military hackers with com-
puter hacking, economic espionage and other offenses directed at targets within
various United States industries, ranging from nuclear power to the metals prod-
ucts industry. 4 8 After assessing the theft, this event was described as one of the
greatest exchanges of economic wealth in history by U.S. officials. The threat of
cybercrime has continued to rise and became the second most reported economic
crime affecting organizations in 2016.49 Many companies were not equipped to
deal with attacks. Less than 37% of the affected companies had cyber security
41 Michael Drury & Julian Hayes, England & Wales, CYBERSECURITY 28, 30 (Benjamin A. Powell &
Jason C. Chipman ed., 2018); Gilbert, supra note 17, at 819.
42 Id.
43 Shannon Yavorsky, GDPR- Unlocking the Security Obligations, LAw360 (July, 20, 2017).
44 Drury & Hayes, supra note 41, at 819.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Exemptions, INFORMATION COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/exemptions/ (last visited on Apr. 12, 2018).
48 Press Release, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. CHARGES FiviE CHINESE MILITARY HACKERS FOR
CYBER ESPIONAGE AGAINST U.S. CORPORATIONS AND A LABOR ORGANIZATION FOR COMMERCIAL AD-
VANTAGE (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-
cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.
49 Global Economic Crime Survey 2016:Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime: Preparation Brings
Opportunity Back Into Focus, PwC (2016) https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/
GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf.
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plans in the event of a cyber hack.50 These hacks have left hundreds of millions
of Americans exposed to identity theft and reveals major flaws in the handling of
American data and the lack of defense mechanisms.5 ' In a world where the bat-
tlefields have morphed, civilians and civilian infrastructure have become prime
and poorly defended targets besieged by unceasing cyber-attacks. 52
As one of the most powerful equalizing strategies, cyber-attacks provided na-
tions who employed cyber tactics the ability to cripple critical infrastructure as a
deterrent, collect military secrets, and employ industrial espionage while acquir-
ing a massive economic advantage. 53 Speed and anonymity provide significant
advantages to states employing aggressive, offensive cyber strategies against
other nations who must sink huge quantities resources for defense. 54 The devas-
tating effects of cyber-attacks can immediately plunge a country into a state of
emergency or slowly deplete their technological capabilities and tactics over
time.5 5 Most attacks are difficult to trace and even harder to identify the perpetra-
tor, leaving no one to hold accountable and allowing for plausible deniability
from state actors.
Additionally, the available responses for hacks are limited, as nations often
lack the jurisdiction to properly prosecute hackers, especially those operating in
foreign countries.56 Convictions, similar to the ones the five Chinese hackers
were handed, are rare. Many believe the best strategy is to establish international
guidelines through diplomacy but that has been ineffective. During his tenure as
president, President Obama attempted to reach agreements with Chinese Presi-
dent Xi Jinping, but failed to make any major headway before leaving office.57
50 Id.
51 Michael Riley, Jordan Robertson, and Anita Sharp, The Equifax Hack has the Hallmarks of State-
Sponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWHEK (Sept. 29, 2017) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/fea
tures/201 7-09-29/the-equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros [hereinafter The
Equifax Hack]; Andrew Ubaka Iwobi, Stumbling Uncertainly into the Digital Age: Nigeria's Futile At-
tempts to Devise a Credible Data Protection Regime, 26 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 30
(Winter 2016) (discussing Lord Hoffman's analysis in R v. Brown as to the invasive nature of modem
technology through data collection and transmission).
52 See, Frddric M6gret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 131 (2011)
(discussing the shifts away from traditional confined battlefields and the difficulties this proposes for the
enforcement of the laws of war).
53 Magnus Hjortdal, China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence, J. OF
STRATEGIC SEc. 4, No. 2, 1 (2011).
54 Id.
55 Scott J. Shackleford & Scott Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Transat-
lantic Study, 67 S.C. L. REV. 609 (Spring 2016).
56 Jyh-An Lee, The Red Storm in Unchartered Waters: China and International Cyber Security, 82
U. Mo.-KAN. CryY L. Rav Voi. 82, No. 4., 951, 959 (2014).
57 Aamer Madhani, Obama, Xi get Closer but Gap Remains on Cybersecurity, USA TODAY (June 8,
2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/08/obama-xi-take-stroll/2403823/.
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III. Discussion: The Shield and the Net, U.S. Cyber-Security Strategies
and Future
While the European Union has chosen to protect those rights, U.S. policy
seeks to expand the national security expectations of surveillance to combat the
threats above. US privacy law has, by contrast, largely developed in a "patch-
work", with an array of state and federal statutes of common law doctrine.58 At
the federal level, the strongest data protection rights come from data protection
regimes like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA")
and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA").59 In a manner
similar to the EU under the DPD, the majority of data protections are provided at
an individual state level and these wildly vary from state to state. 60 Due to this
lower threshold for privacy and censorship laws, users have different experiences
when visiting websites in the United States, as opposed to within the EU. 6 1
While the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides protection from
unreasonable search and seizures from the government, it does not guarantee a
right to personal information stored from private actors. 62 Since 9/11, many of
the original protections for U.S. citizens regarding their data have been eroded,
including the protections provided by the Foreign Intelligence Service Act of
1978 (FISA 1978). FISA 1978 was originally drafted with a dual purpose in
mind. In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, it was discovered that CIA opera-
tives had conducted missions on domestic soil, breaking their mandate. 63 The
CIA infiltrated political activist groups, unions and other elements of domestic
society, as they believed these groups were working with foreign dissidents and
spies to disrupt national security.64 Thus, FISA 1978 was written to operate as
both a limit on the surveillance powers of the Executive branch and as a frame-
work to conduct international intelligence gathering and countermeasures, in-
cluding instances when the data of U.S. citizens are involved.6 5 Under the
minimization principle, analysts are and are still required to reduce the effect and
intrusions on the rights of Americans when collecting data investigating foreign
intelligence and nationals. 66
58 McGeveran, supra note 8, at 965.
59 Id.
6 See, Watanabe, supra note 5, at 1122 (the state that provides the strongest protections, California,
has its own version of the right of erasure exclusively for minors).
61 Victor Luckerson, Americans Will Never Have the Right to be Forgotten, TnYm (May 14, 2014),
http://time.com/98554/right-to-be-forgotten.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Sherri J. Deckelboim, Note, Consumer Privacy on an International Scale:
Conflicting Viewpoints Underlying the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework and How the Framework Will
Impact Advocates, National Security, And Businesses, 48 GEO. J. INT'L L. 263, 272 (2016).
63 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Dr,'Tr OF JUSTICE, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLib
erty/authorities/statutes/1286 [hereinafter FISA 1978 Overview Page].
64 Id.
65 FISA 1978 Overview Page, supra note 63; United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 (E.D.
Va. 2006). See also, Macaskill & Dance, supra note 18, at 3.
66 FISA 1978 Overview Page, supra note 63.
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Starting in 1995, FISA 1978 has been revised and amended seven times, the
most notable being the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act
and the FISA 2008 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA 2008).67 In 2008, the FISA
regulation was updated to include Section 702, which provided the authority for
security agencies to compel telecommunication networks to aid in the acquisition
of foreign intelligence information related to non-US persons residing in foreign
countries.6 8 The framework followed shares some similarities with FISA 1978.
To request information, analysts must show that they have properly determined
the location to be outside of the U.S. and have taken steps to minimize and re-
move the domestic communications. 6 9 Any data collected that still includes a
U.S. citizen and a foreign national target is permissible so long as the intrusion
into the data of American citizens is minimized. Analysts compile this informa-
tion into a certification, in lieu of a search warrant, showing that the proper col-
lection procedures were followed. 70 An annual review process is used to ensure
protocols are up-date and followed.7 1
Under Section 702, the NSA describes data collections as "upstream" and
"downstream" collection.7 2 Within Upstream collection, the NSA intercepts data
over fiber cables and from infrastructure. The NSA collects data and communica-
tions throughout the world, most of which goes through the United Kingdom and
the United States.7 3 The NSA defines "upstream" data collection as "[collections
acquired from] communications 'to, from, or about' a Section 702 Selector". 74 Of
the two collection methods, "upstream" accounts for smaller accounts, with some
estimates sitting at 9% of the total data collection.7 5 The "about target" data is
information that is communicated between individuals, who are not targets them-
selves, about a topic or discussion that is a target in question.76 This allows the
NSA to collect information from anyone, including two parties of American citi-
zens, so long as the NSA identifies a specific target and relation to the threat
67 Id.
68 FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Section 702 Summary Document, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1, 3 (Dec. 23, 2008).
69 Upstream v. PRISM, ELFc. FRONTIER FOUND, https://www.eff.org/pages/upstream-prism (last vis-
ited Dec. 4, 2017).
70 Id. at 6-12.
71 Ellen Nakashima, NSA Halts Controversial Email Collection Practice to Preserve Larger Surveil-
lance Program, WASH. Posr (Apr. 28, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
nsa-Ohalts-controversial-email-collection-practice-to-preserve-larger-surveillance-program/2017/04/28/
e2ddf9a0-2c3f-1 1e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee-story.html?utmterm=.31e7ae911c71.
72 Public Statement, NSA Stops Certain Section 702 "Upstream" Activities, NAT'L SEC. AGENCY
(Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/statements/2017-04-28-702-statement
.shtml [hereinafter Public Statement].
73 Macaskill & Dance, supra note 18, at 3 (the NSA nicknamed the flow of data 'home field advan-
tage' due to the high amounts that travel through allied territory).
74 Public Statement, supra note 72.
75 Nakashima, supra note 71.
76 Public Statement, supra note 72.
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being investigated.7 7 This is a circumvention to the minimization principle set
forth in the original FISA. 78 Following serious missteps and abuses of civil liber-
ties and the potential repeal of Section 702 as whole and cease spying in court,
NSA offered to regulate themselves and voluntarily cease the "about target"
searches. 79 The removal allowed Section 702 surveillance to continue collecting
large quantities of data "upstream", only when the communications were be-
tween foreign nationals.80
In tandem with the upstream collection operations, PRISM is the downstream
data collection counterpart responsible for collecting data from major US Internet
companies.8 1 Defined as "[the collection of] communications 'to or from' a Sec-
tion 702 selector", Prism collected data, such as search history and emails, di-
rectly from participating business' servers, beginning with Microsoft on
September 11, 2007.82 Prior to the Snowden's document lease, major businesses
were complying with security requests for data were releasing up to 20,000 cus-
tomer accounts per year and it frequently data collected from Prism usually ap-
peared in the President's daily intelligence report.8 3 Many of the companies that
were provided data through PRISM later denied knowledge when the existence
of the program was revealed. 84
In response to the Snowden revelations, an Austrian student and Facebook
user, Max Schrems, learned that his data was being collected by Facebook's sub-
sidiary in Ireland and transferring it to the United States improperly.8 5 Bringing
his claim to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, the initial case was thrown
out because the US was deemed to ensure 'adequate' levels of protection under
the Safe Harbor framework.8 6 Schrems appealed to the High Court of Ireland and
the case was placed in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).8 7 The
Advocate General of the EU, Yves Bot, described the Safe Harbor as a compro-
mised framework that acted as a conduit for the US data collection programs
under the NSA, rather than as a recourse mechanism for EU citizens.8 8 As a
77 Nakashima, supra note 71.
78 Id; Michelle Richardson, Time to Permanently End NSA's "About" Searches in Communications
Content under FISA 702, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TE CHNOLOGY, (Jun. 22, 2017) https://cdt.org/blog/
time-to-permanently-end-nsas-about-searches-in-communications-content-under-fisa-702/.
79 Nakashima, supra note 71.
80 Public Statement, supra note 72.
81 Macaskill & Dance, supra note 18, at 3; See also, Nakashima, supra note 71.
82 Macaskill & Dance, supra note 18, at 3 (the PRISM slides were leaked by Edward Snowden in
2013).
83 Mark Prigg, Technology Giants Reveal How Often They are Ordered to Turn Over Information to
the Government (and it's Thousarus, of Times a Month), DAILY MAIL (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2551277/Technology-giants-reveal-ordered-tum-information-Govemment
.html; Nakashima, supra note 71.
84 Macaskill & Dance, supra note 18, at 3.
85 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2018), https://epic.org/privacy/intl/schrems/ [hereinafter EPIC Schrems].
86 EPIC Schrems, supra note 85.
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guaranteed right under the EU charter, the failure to provide adequate recourse
made the Safe Harbor framework inoperable.89 The CJEU agreed and ruled that
the Safe Harbor framework did not ensure the adequacy threshold due to the
intrusive nature of the American data collection system for Schrems. 90
Due to a combination of mistrust of U.S. data collection and massive surveil-
lance, coupled with serious, external cyber-threats, a framework was established
to enable the secure international transfer across the Atlantic. While the EU and
U.S. were renegotiating the Safe Harbor framework prior to the Schrems deci-
sion, the invalidation disrupted the flow of transatlantic data.9 1 Known as the EU-
US Privacy Shield, the U.S. Department of Commerce and European Commis-
sion established a voluntary method for companies to implement protections and
receive approval to meet adequacy standards under the DPD.9 2 To overcome the
past problems with the DPD, the Privacy Shield framework allows businesses
certify that they reach adequate levels of data protection and allows European
business to know who allows their citizens recourse. 9 3 Its goals are to support the
transatlantic transfer of data and imbue more trust into the system of data protec-
tion.94 The U.S. government has done little to reinforce European trust in such
frameworks.9 5
To further complicate the diplomatic situation, H.R. 4478 was passed and
signed, renewing and amending Section 702 and FISA 2008 on January 19,
2018.96 Controversy surrounded the amendment of FISA 2008 in late November,
2017, as it provided lawmakers with less than 48 hours to make decisions regard-
89 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Comm'n, Opinion of the Advocate Gen-
eral Bot (Sept. 23, 2015), 1218, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc
30dd4c797cdcac6340d7a77ba9c727ald350.e34KaxiLc3qMb4RchOSaxuRaN90?text=&docid=168421
&pagelndex-0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir-&occ=first&part=1&cid=524326 ("[. . owing to the
breaches of fundamental rights described above, the safe harbor scheme which it establishes cannot be
regarded as ensuring an adequate level protection of the personal data transferred").
90 EPIC Schrems, supra note 85. Schrems has filed a second trial, denoted colloquially as Schrems II,
that focuses on the validity of standard contractual clauses and whether the transfers under this method in
fact adequate. Adam Finlay & Paul Lavery, Validity of Standard Contractual Clauses to be referred to
CJEU, MCCANN Friz/GlRA.D (Oct. 4, 2017) https://www.mccannfitzgerald.com/knowledge/privacy/vali
dity-of-standard-contractual-clauses-to-be-referred-to-cjeu.
91 Safe Harbor Invalidation, Cooi.y LLP, https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2015/2015-safe-
harbor-invalidation (last visited on Apr. 2, 2018).
92 The Swiss and U.S. also have a Privacy Shield Framework Agreement. Privacy Shield Overview,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
93 Id.
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95 Cameron F. Kerry, Trump Puts U.S.-EU Privacy Shield at Risk, BROOKINGS TECH TANK (June 14,
2017) https://www.brookings.edulblog/techtank/2017/06/14/trump-puts-u-s-eu-privacy-shield-at-risk/
(Currently, the Privacy Shield is supported solely by an Obama executive order that extends privacy
protections to foreign nationals. Repealing this executive order would result in a defunct version of
Privacy Shield).
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as Amended The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 https://intelligence.house.gov/
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ing its content. 97 The amendments added a probable cause-based requirement to
view data under Section 702 for FBI criminal investigations unrelated to national
security and a new specific query procedure that builds on the foundation of the
minimization principles. 98
H.R. 4478 would widen the pool of individuals and organizations that could be
searched by including those engaging in a vast range of cybercrimes, regardless
of who actually accessed the computer.99 While some feared H.R. 4478 would
reauthorize the collection of "about target" data, the bill requires a mandatory
and temporary cessation of "about target" collections for the foreseeable fu-
ture.1" The amendment leaves the door open and allows the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence to declare their intent to resume "about
search" collections to congressional committees.' 0 A 30-day period of congres-
sional review would determine whether such searches should resume. 102 How-
ever, the ACLU fears that political gridlock will stop Congress from acting in
time during such a period, resulting the codification of such searches. 0 3
Efforts were made to include unmasking rules, a polarizing issue involving
House Intelligence Chairman Devin Nunes claiming to have information relating
to the Obama administration 'unmasking' names of the Trump's transition team
within reports for political gain.104 Under the minimization requirements of
FISA, domestic citizens are not to be included except when the information is
already public available, the intelligence information would not make sense with-
out the U.S. citizen's identity, and/or when the U.S. citizen might be working
with a foreign nation. 0 5 This leads to the potential abuse of revealing the identity
of U.S. citizens who are unrelated to the search, violating their rights. Despite
being exclude from H.R. 4478, the Director of National Intelligence issued new
procedures detailing the approval process with a standard of "fact-based justifica-
tion" and the need for a concurrence from the intelligence community general
97 Neema Singh Guliani, NSA Surveillance Bill Would Dramatically Expand NSA Powers, Am. Civ.
Liberties Union (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/
new-surveillance-bill-would-dramatically-expand-nsa (those falling under the national security exception
would greatly increase as 'malicious cybercrimes' are broadly defined and likely could include anything
from smaller acts of piracy to terrorist communications and recruiting, regardless of whether the com-
puter owner had committed the crime).
98 Highlights of S. 139, supra note 96; Karoun Demirjian, House Intelligence Committee Passes spy-
bill Renewal, But on Party Lines, THEi WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
powerpost/house-intelligence-committee-passes-spy-bill-renewal-but-on-party-lines/20 17/12/01/8aa236
7e-d686-l1 le7-95bf-df7cl9270879 story.html?utm term=.4b86f9fd5bf3.
9 Guliani, supra note 97.
100 Highlights of S. 139, supra note 96; Daniel Wilson, House Panel Approves Surveillance Renewal
Bill Law360, https://www.1aw360.com/articles/989972/house-panel-approves-surveillance-renewal-bill/;
Guliani, supra note 97 (about data targets information specifically about a person, without looking into
an individual's own communications or data).
101 Highlights of S. 139, supra note 96.
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counsel to allow the unmasking of presidential transition team members in the
days prior to H.R. 4478's renewal.' 06
IV. Analysis: A Breakdown in Herd Immunity: The GDPR Effects on
Business and the Security's Field
Herd immunity is most effective when that critical number of the group is
immunized. 0 7 In cyber security, the concept is illustrated well when analyzing
the period of the DPD. EU member states that had weaker and inconsistent laws
for protecting data were more exposed and allowed for major exploitation. 0 s
Without the consistent immunities throughout a majority of the member states,
this patchwork of data protection laws were largely ineffective for the EU.109 In
creating the GDPR, the EU's goal to harmonize data laws, curb the effects of
data breaches, and provide citizens with some control over their data is now
being offered to the international community as vaccination in order to reach a
new critical mass. 10
To acquire the critical mass quickly, GDPR mandatory compliance begins on
May 25, 2018 and there will be no trial period to test what methods are most
effective.'I American businesses and international data controllers that process
EU data will bound to comply and held liable for breaches and potentially subject
to the astronomically high fines.' 12 The expectation by European lawmakers is
that all businesses were aware of the compliance requirements and would have
already mapped out their current data processing and data handling methods.113
Such mapping may include isolation and identification of what information
should be processed pursuant to the GDPR, which third party members are re-
ceiving information, allocating a budget in case of breaches and noncompliance
with the new regulation, and implementing mechanisms that support data rights,
such as Google Spain creating erasure request forms for their site.1 4 These new
procedures are expensive and require a massive number of employees to estab-
106 Press Release, DIRUCrOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, DNI Coats Establishes New Intelligence
Community Policy on Request for Identities of U.S. Persons in Disseminated Intelligence Reports, (Jan.
11, 2018); Rebecca Shabad, Director of National Intelligence Issues New Guidelines for Intel Report
Unmasking, (Jan. 11, 2018) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/director-of-national-intelligence-issues-new-
guidelines-for-intel-report-unmasking/.
107 Willingham & Helft, supra note 1.
10 Scott J. Shackleford & Scott Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Transat-
lantic Study, 67 S.C. L. Rov. 609 (Spring 2016).
109 Gilbert, supra note 17, at 819.
110 Caroline Krass, Jason N. Kleinwaks & Ahmed Baladi, A GDPR Primer for US-Based Cos. Han-
dling EU Data: Part I Law360, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Krass-Kleinwaks-
Baladi-Bartoli-A-GDPR-Primer-For-US-Based-Cos-Handling-EU-Data-Part-1-Law360-12-12-2017.pdf
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lish and maintain a data processing system that complies with the GDPR." 5 For
some Fortune companies, the technology alone will cost $1,000,000.116 Compa-
nies are expected to maintain close watches over third parties and any informa-
tion set to a third country must meet the adequacy test.' '7
The GDPR 'vaccine' will likely provide some benefits for international citi-
zens. For example, data breaches that affect EU data will likely also affect all
data process within a specific company, regardless of the separate systems for
processing. With those breaches reported to the EU within 72 hours under the
new requirements, the citizens and the governments will be more aware of the
potential that data was stolen and can better monitor and respond to other poten-
tial threats.' 1 8 Watchful eyes on third parties may alert companies to potential
misuse of a user's data but 22% of U.S. companies reported that there was no
budget established to support third party legal consequences." 9
However, with the American data still under a separate system and with the
questions about the enforceability of the fines, corners will likely be cut.1 20 Any
EU data processing automatically requires a company comply with the GDPR,
meaning companies that rarely come into contact with data from the EU may be
unaware of the potential fines and could be underprepared to protect
information.121
While it might behoove some companies economically to create a single-tier
system based on the GDPR, it is incredibly unlikely that U.S. businesses will
adopt these standards for the American data. Currently, data, metadata, and infor-
mation are huge commodities for both national security protections and for busi-
nesses.1 22 Data demand is high and the analytics of that data reveals habits,
needs, and opportunities to make money.1 2 3 The data protections of the GDPR
would limit the forms of data that could be transferred and would have to explain
why that data -was being transferred to the consumer, a process that would di-
115 Tobias Brhugtigam, How to Budget for a GDPR Project: A Primer, INTERNATIONAL AssocIATION
OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONAILS (Nov. 29, 2016) https://iapp.org/news/a/how-to-budget-for-a-gdpr-project-a-
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GROUP https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/gdpr-true-cost-of-compliance/; Ray Schultz, The
Price of Compliance: Study Uncovers GDPR Costs, MEDIAPOST, https://www.mediapost.com/publica-
tions/article/309342/the-price-of-compliance-study-uncovers-gdpr-costs.html.
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120 Dellinger, supra note 40 (at this moment, there are questions as to whether the fines will even be
enforceable on U.S. based companies).
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rectly affect the profitability of the information that is being sold. If the data were
to be stripped down and limited by what a company is absolutely allowed to
have, the commodity price and its potential effectiveness are also diminished.
Additionally, implementing the two-tiered system is economically advantageous
because if consumers were informed each time their data was transferred and
why, the economic viability of the data exchange would be reduced.1 2 4 While the
lowered value could revolutionize data protection, a two-tiered system subject to
extensive fines for failures to comply leaves companies with less to invest in
defenses. 125 With such unprotected security gaps, the herd of data processors is
ultimately left exposed.
These same businesses would have to comport each of their multi-level, data
security frameworks to a new set of regulations for data requests and still try to
honor the data rights of its EU citizens.1 26 The succinct collection of data under
the right to data portability would benefit national security surveillance. When
requested, businesses will simply hand over data and metadata crafted for the
portability, including any additional inferences from the algorithms that would
not have been included for the data subject. While placing the limits on the
amount of time that a data controller may hold information decreases the chances
of either the government requesting it or the information being robbed due to a
hack, most information is never permanently deleted. 1 2 7 If "about target" collec-
tions were to allowed to resume, the collection of multiple data points from dif-
ferent data collectors could be synthesized and used to illustrate data as if it had
been collected under the PRISM project, diluting the privacy protections of EU
citizens under the GDPR. 1 2 8
V. Proposal: Vaccination
As long as there is a disparity in the level of security used to protect European
data from all other data, there will be strain on the resources that are utilized to
protect such data. To alleviate the strain of the two-tiered system on the data
protection, Congress needs to pass a permanent ban on "about target searches".
International governments should involve their own citizens by implementing
Fair Processing Requirements and the Right to be Informed from the GDPR.
By eliminating the "about target" searches, Congress would prevent the Exec-
utive branch from overstepping by collection information of foreign and domes-
124 Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data's Different Burdens and Benefits STAN.
L. REv. (Sept. 2013)("[A]ny given individual's data only becomes useful when it is aggregated together
to be exploited for good or ill") https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-buying-
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tic individuals who are not the targets of the investigation themselves. 1 2 9 While
other forms of data collection will still occur, by eliminating this egregious form,
the data collected will more squarely fall in line with the GDPR's exception for
national defense under Article 23, as at least one individual in the communication
will be the suspected and targeted individual.1 3 0
Furthermore, by providing citizens with more consumer notifications on their
data, the accountability would extend beyond the companies. When properly in-
formed of the locale of the data and the intended recipients, citizens can pro-
vide a new level of inoculation to the protection scheme. By expanding Articles
13-15 of the GDPR to American data, consumers could take an active role in
monitoring the intended data recipients and the protective measures during the
data utilization.' 3 ' While U.S. privacy allows companies to compile data under
the First Amendment, notification of data utilization and the intended data users
acknowledges consumers' concerns.1 3 2 This would force companies to be more
transparent. Transparency translates to accountability. Companies would be held
accountable should a data breach occur.' 33
By melding in some GDPR data rights and restricting the 'about target'
searches, the burden on companies to maintain a two-tier system will reduce and
allow for more resources to go towards cyber defense.
VI. Conclusion
Data protection rights are most effective when each party is involved with
processing, collecting, and updating the information, while protecting themselves
through similar means. The GDPR offers the international community the latest
inoculation to protect citizens' data rights. However, so long as broad exceptions
to these rights exist and countries, like the U.S., have different privacy standards
and data collection methods, an inoculation will be ineffective for attaining a
critical mass to protect the herd. Adopting even some of the data rights gradually
would provide the U.S. with an additional fighting chance on the battlefield of
cyber warfare.
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